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THE PRIVILEGE ARGUMENT-HOW IT HAS FARED
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Practicing law and receiving unemployment compensation have
something in common--courts have classified both of them as
privileges.' Other examples of activities which the courts have
called privileges include: selling liquor,2 incorporating a business,2
being released early from prison because time is deducted for good
conduct,4 receiving property upon the death of the owner,' voting,0
hunting,7 and using the highways for commercial purposes.8 En-
compassing them all is the usual definition of a privilege: ".... a par-
ticular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, com-
pany, or class beyond the common advantage of other citizens."' In
contradistinction to a right, a privilege is generally considered to be
a mere gratuity which the government may entirely withhold."'
When the state or federal government takes action limiting a
privilege," the fact that it is only a privilege which is affected has
often been used as a premise for an argument upholding the action
against constitutional challenge. This "privilege argument" takes
the following form. The government has the power to forbid abso-
lutely the enjoyment of privileges. The power to forbid includes the
power to condition. All that the government has done is to set up
certain qualifications or conditions for the enjoyment of a privilege.
Therefore, the disputed action is within the power of the govern-
ment.
1. In re Petition for Integration of the Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195,
12 N. W. 2d 515 (1943) (law) ; Dworken v. Collopy, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 91
N. E. 2d 564 (C.P. 1950) (unemployment compensation).
2. Yardbrough v. Montoya, 54 N. M. 91, 214 P. 2d 769 (1950).
3. Pue v. Hood, 222 N. C. 310, 22 S. E. 2d 896 (1942).
4. Story v. Rives, 97 F. 2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
5. Blodgett v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 115 Conn. 127, 161 Atd. 83
(1932).
6. Washington v. Alabama, 75 Ala. *582 (1884).
7. Hanley v. Indiana, 126 N. E. 2d 879 (Ind. 1955).
8. Darnall Trucking Co. v. Simpson, 122 W. Va. 656, 12 S. E. 2d 516(1940).
9. Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 3 Okla. 677, 689, 41 Pac. 635, 639(1895), quoting Black's Law Dictionary.
10. See, e.g., Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York State, 143 U. S. 305(1892).
11. This Note uses "privilege" only in the sense already given: as a
special benefit conferred by the government upon a special group. The term,
of course, has many other meanings, e.g., a permissive use of land, an im-
munity from testifying, or a protection from liability for slander. It might also
be pointed out that the reference to "privileges and immunities" in the Federal
Constitution does not refer to the type of "privileges" with which this Noteis concerned. E.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 85 U. S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873)(practicing law not within the 14th Amendment privileges and immunities
clause).
This Note is an attempt to cut horizontally through diversified
areas of the law so as to provide an estimate of the general success
with which this privilege argument has met. Because of the scarcity
of literature concerning privilege and the great number of cases
involved, it is necessary to use examples and proceed inductively.
No effort is made to "solve" problems raised in the examples or to
summarize the law in a particular area. For example, when con-
sidering the use of the privilege argument in upholding loyalty
oaths, no attempt is made to determine what types of loyalty oaths
are constitutionally permissible. Another limitation of this Note
is that there has been no consideration of how the privilege argu-
ment has fared in two large fields: namely, the right to a hearing,
either judicial or administrative, and the right to a review of a
hearing.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE USE OF THE PRIVILEGE ARGUMENT
Loyalt Oaths
Loyalty oaths have been litigated in many different contexts,
so it is interesting to notice the efficacy of the privilege argument in
upholding them. As to loyalty oaths relating to past conduct, the
landmark cases arose out of the Civil War. Following the war,
some of the states made test oaths prerequisite to such diverse activi-
ties as voting,' holding public office,13 following Various vocations,1 '
and opening up a default judgment.1 5 The required attestations were
generally to the effect that the afflant had never supported the Con-
federacy or been disloyal to the United States. Arguing that a state
could attach such qualifications as it wished to the various privileges
involved, the proponents of these oaths thought them constitutional.
This is the reasoning by which, for example, the Missouri court held
an oath a proper prerequisite to the privilege of voting. 8 On the
other hand, opponents argued that the legislation requiring the
oaths were really bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. This is
the position which the United States Supreme Court took in two
cases, Cunmings v. Missouri7 and EX Parte Garland.'8 In the
Cluinings case the Court dealt with the oath required by Missouri
for a priest to teach or preach. In the Garland case the oath was one
required by Congress for a lawyer to practice in the federal courts.
12. See Burkett v. McCarty, 10 Bush 758 (Ky. 1866).
13. See State ex rel. Wingate v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227 (1867).
14. See Murphy & Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339 (1867).
15. See Pierce v. Carskadon, 85 U. S. (16 WalL) 234 (1873).
16. Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867).
17. 73 U. S. (4 WalL) 277 (1867).
18. 73 U. S. (4 WaIL) 333 (1867).
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In both instances, by 5 to 4 decisions, the Court struck down the
conditions as bills of attainder. A bill of attainder was defined as
"a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial
trial." 9 The Court reasoned that sympathy with the Rebellion did
not constitute unfitness to preach or practice law; therefore, the
conditions could not reasonably have to do with qualifications for
the jobs, but rather stood only as punishment for past action.
Another loyalty oath case, Wienman v. Updegraff,20 places a
different limitation on the state's power to deny a privilege because
of past conduct. The limitation is the due process requirement of
fairness. In the Updegraff case an Oklahoma statute required an
oath that the affiant had, among other things, never belonged to
an organization listed as "subversive" by the U. S. Attorney Gen-
eral. The oath was struck down because it excluded persons from
the privilege of state employment regardless of their knowledge
of subversive activities of organizations to which they had belonged.
The Court felt that establishing "guilt by association" without
more was not consistent with due process. This reversed the Okla-
homa court, which had upheld the statute on the ground that if a
person wanted public employment he could have it only on the terms
suitable to the state.21
The Cummings case and the Updegraff case, taken together,
seem to limit considerably a government's power to withhold privi-
leges because of past conduct. The Cummings case prevents the
denial of privileges for punishment of past acts. It also introduces
the idea of reasonable relationship. I.e., if it is unreasonable to sup-
pose the past conduct is related to the proper exercise of the privi-
lege, under the Cummings case doctrine it is thought that the legisla-
tion is an unconstitutional attempt to impose punishment. The
Updegraff case doctrine introduces the motion of fairness implicit
in due process, and applies this to determine whether the qualifica-
tion concerning past conduct is a proper one.
When disputed loyalty oaths relate to present or future conduct.
the oaths often have been upheld.2 2 For instance, such a loyalty
oath has been held to be a proper condition to the privilege of obtain-
ing unemployment compensation.2 3 A well-noted case in which
19. Cummings v. Missouri, 73 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867).
20. 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
21. Board of Regents of Okla. Agriculture Colleges v. Updegraff, 205
Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131 (1951).
22. See collection of cases at Annot., 18 A. L. R. 2d 268, 305-307,309-314(1951).
23. Dworken v. Collopy, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 91 N. E. 2d 564 (Ct. C. P.
1950).
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an oath relating to present conduct was sustained is American
Cohmmications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds.2 There the statute required
a non-communist oath from labor union leaders before the NLRB
could recognize the union as a bargaining agent. The Supreme
Court, however, rejected the idea that the oath could be upheld on
the bare idea that the use of the NLRB was a privilege which the
government could withdraw. 25 Rather, the Court chose to weigh the
interests involved and take into account the reasonableness of a
possible connection between communist labor leaders and disrup-
tions of commerce.26 This association was thought to be sufficient
so that the Court could say there was no unnecessary infringement
of constitutional rights. The Court then went on to distinguish
Cummings v. Missouri on the ground that the present oath did not
punish anyone who was a communist, since it could be signed by
anyone who would renounce any such association he had in the
,past.2 7
Go'ernment Employment
Government employment has often been labeled a privilege by
the courts.2 8 It is in this area that the case of United States v.
Lovett29 provides an interesting reiteration of the Cummings case
doctrine. Congress had passed a bill cutting off the salaries of certain
named federal employees. These persons had been suspected of sub-
versive activities, but the evidence conflicts as to whether Congress
had intended to punish or had simply thought the persons unquali-
fied for government service.30 The Court found the legislation to be
a permanent proscription from government employment because
of past actions and, as such, punishment and a bill of attainder.
With these conclusions the concurring justices did not agree. They
pointed out that on its face the bill did not appear to be a bill of
attainder, that it did not disqualify the persons from federal service,
and that it could be regarded as only a stoppage of the normal
method of compensating the employees for their services.8 ' In -view
of the Court's usual tendency to give legislation the benefit of a
constitutional doubt, it seems that the Court has a marked antipathy
24. 339 U. S. 382 (1950).
25. Id. at 390.
26. Id. at 387-389, 390-391.
27. Id. at 413-414.
28. E.g., Goldway v. Board of Higher Education, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 34,
36, 178 Misc. 1023, 1025 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (dictum).
29. 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
30. 45 Mich. L. Rev. 98 (1946).




toward attempts to punish for past conduct by withholding a
privilege.
The Lovett case is doubly interesting in view of the traditional
attitude the courts have taken toward government employment.
Justice Holmes' statement that "The petitioner may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman" 32 perhaps best illustrates the thought that runs
through many opinions.3 3 It is in the area of government employ-
ment that the privilege argument has been accepted with alacrity.3 4
Still, the cases in the Supreme Court seems to proceed on the im-
plicit assumption that the qualifications on the employment are
subject to requirements of due process. Thus, for example, in
United Public Workers, CIO v. Mitchell," upholding a portion of
the Hatch Act, and Adler v. Board of Education of Newv York
City,36 upholding loyalty oaths for New York teachers, the opinions
intimate that if these conditions had been unreasonable, they would
have been struck down.'- The requirement of due process was made
explicit in the Updegraff case, but the emphasis there seems more
on the unfairness of the procedure as distinguished from the rea-
sonableness of the restriction.
Practice of a Profession
There is another group of cases in which one finds the privilege
argument: namely, cases dealing with the practice of those profes-
sions, such as medicine, which particularly concern the general
public. The practice of these professions is often said to be a privi-
lege.3" Yet, the courts frequently omit the privilege talk and make
some hint about the necessity for qualifications on the profession to
be reasonable.3 9 In this there seems to be a rejection of the bare
privilege argument. However, it is difficult to find any cases in
which the courts strike down qualifications as unreasonable, even
where one might expect this to happen. For example, in 1872 the
32. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,220,29 N. E. 517 (1892).
33. E.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 341 U. S. 918 (1951).
34. See Note, Restrictions on the Civil Rights of Federal Employees,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 1161 (1947) for a review of the extent to which the con-
stitutional rights of government employees have been restricted; Note, The
"Right" to a Government Job, 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 451 (1952) for a considera-
tion of unconstitutional conditions on the privilege of government employment.
35. 330 U. S. 75 (1947).
36. 342 U. S. 485 (1952).
37. 330 U. S. at 100; 342 U. S. at 494-496.
38. E.g., State ex ret. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 572, 4 N. W. 2d
302, 311 (1942) (dictum).
39. E.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 122 (1889) (dictum)
(condition must be "appropriate" and "obtainable").
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Supreme Court upheld a condition forbidding any woman from
practicing law.4 0 The concurring justices thought the public needed
to be protected from all women lawyers,4' but one wonders whether
the majority themselves thought this wholesale prohibition reason-
ably necessary. In re Summers, 2 where the Court upheld a condi-
tion requiring a lawyer to swear to bear arms for the state if called,
is another case in point. It is to be doubted that there is such a strong
need for militant lawyers as to justify the condition as a reasonable
qualification on the practice of law.43 Another instance where the
Court took a liberal view of reasonableness is one concerning a
statute prohibiting the practice of medicine if the person had previ-
ously committed a felony.- The first Justice Harlan, writing the
dissenting opinion, would have treated the act as a penal ex post
facto law.45 Yet, although most state cases seem to refer to the
revocation of licenses to practice medicine as penal in nature," the
Supreme Court did not think the statute to be a penal e-x post facto
laiv, but rather only one imposing a reasonable condition on the
profession.47 What appears to have happened in these cases is that
the Court, after expressing a need for reasonable qualifications, is
satisfied if -the government might have had any sort of rational basis
for connecting the condition with the occupation.
Use of Public Property
Another common occasion for the use of the privilege argument
arises when the use of public property is made dependent upon the
applicant giving up a constitutional right. The most familiar illus-
tration has to do with the privilege of using the public streets for
commercial transportation. It is this use, which has been so often
classified as a privilege,4 that the Supreme Court considered in
Frost & Frost Tracking Co. v. Railroad Comm' ." There a state's
attempt to require a private carrier to become a common carrier
as a condition for using the roads was held unconstitutional. Justice
40. Bradwell v. Illinois, 85 U. S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
41. Id. at 139 (concurring opinion).
42. 325 U. S. 561 (1945).
43. See Brief for American Friends Service Comm. as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 26-68, In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945).
44. Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898).
45. Id. at 200 (dissenting opinion).
46. E.g., Schireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 458, 461-462, 47 A. 2d 665, 667(1946) (dictum).
47. Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898).
48. E.g., Nulter v. State Rd. Comm'n, 119 V. Va. 312, 317-318, 193 S. E.
549, 552 (1937) (dictum).
49. 271 U. S. 583 (1926).
50. Id. at 592-593.
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Sutherland, speaking for the Court, bluntly posed the question
whether a condition to a privilege could be the waiver of a consti-
tutional right ° and answered it "no."
However admirable the Justice's answer may be as a statement
of principle, it is another matter whether the doctrine is applied.
As to this the Frost opinion contains an observation which perhaps
retains its validity today: "And the principle, that a state is without
power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition for
granting a privilege, is broader than the applications thus far made
of it."' An example of the non-application of this principle is fur-
nished by Justice Sutherland himself, in Stephenson v. Binford,5
decided six years later. In that case a state's attempt to require a
private carrier to give up the constitutional right to set its own rates
as a condition for using the roads was held constitutional. The
opinion by Justice Sutherland emphasizes the state's power to con-
dition privileges and makes broad statements to the effect that the
courts have no power to review state action in prescribing qualifi-
cations on privileges it does not have to grant.5 3 Comparing the
Frost and Stephenson opinions one is driven to the conclusion that
they are simply inconsistent in principle.
Still, it is in cases involving the use of public property that the
courts are coming to recognize the danger that constitutional rights
may be restricted indirectly under the guise of conditioning privi-
leges. A shift in this direction may be illustrated by two cases from
the Supreme Court. In 1897 the Court decided that for a state abso-
lutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a street or park
was no more an infringement of a citizen's rights than if an owner
of a private house forbade him to enter. Hence, it was said, the
citizen had no right to use a public park except as the city might
prescribe.54 In 1939 the Court rejected this idea, declaring that
the public's power over streets and parks was not as complete its
that which a private person could exercise over his property. Even
though the right to assemble was not absolute, the city could not
impose arbitrary conditions; constitutional rights could not be so
easily foreclosed consistently with due process. 55
The courts have not, however, overwhelmingly recognized the
danger in restricting constitutional rights via the privilege argu-
"51. Id. at 598.
52. 287 U. S. 251 (1932).
53. E.g., "... [I]t belongs to the State ... to prescribe the conditions
upon which it will permit public work to be done .... No court has authority
to review its action in that respect." Id. at 276.
54. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43 (1897).
55. Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
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ment. This is pointed .up by the cases which have dealt with the
Gwinn Amendment to the Independent Offices Appropriations
Act of 1953. The Gwinn Amendment" provides that public housing
built with the aid of federal funds shall be denied to a person who is
a member of any organization designated as subversive by the
Attorney General. In three of the seyen cases found reaching the
courts, the idea that housing is a government gratuity prevails, and
those courts would allow the government to deny housing because
the applicants have joined the wrong organizations.5 7 In the other
two cases the courts refused to infringe upon the constitutional right
of freedom of speech by so conditioning the privileges, and the
state regulation enforcing the Gwinn Amendment was struck
down.58 The opinions in the four cases show the range of concern
over the dangers of restricting constitutional rights through the
argument that the government is dealing with something less than
a right.
Operation of a Business
The restriction of constitutional rights through qualifications on
privileges has been often condemned in cases involving the privilege
of operating certain businesses. In fact, it has been done so often that
the reasoning used in rejecting the condition has been accorded a
name-the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 9 The prime
example of the use of this doctrine has to do with statutes which re-
quired a foreign corporation doing business within the state to
agree that it would not use the tederal courts. In the first case
dealing with these statutes, Insurance Company v. Morse,00 the
Supreme Court held 5 to 4 that the state statute was unconstiuttional
as depriving the corporation of substantial rights without due
process of law. A waiver of constitutional rights could not-be made
56. 66 Stat. 403, 42 U. S. C. § 1411 c. (1952).
57. Rudder v. United States, 105 A. 2d 741 (Munic. Ct. App., D.C.
1954), rev'd on other grounds, 226 F. 2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Peters v. New
York City Housing Authority, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 712, ret'd
on other grounds, 307 N. Y. 519, 121 N. E. 2d 529 (1954) ; Weixell v. New
,York City Housing Authority, 208 Misc. 246, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 589 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
58. Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 IlL 2d 319, 122 N. E.
2d 522 (1954); Kutcher v. Newark Housing Authority, 119 A. 2d 1 (N.J.
1955) ; Lawson v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N. WV.
2d 605 (1955), cert. denied, 24 U. S. L. Week 3128 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1955) (No.
354) ; Housing Authority of Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
883, 279 P. 2d 215 (Super. Ct. 1955),'cert. denicd, 24 U. S. L. Week 3225
(U.S. Feb. 27, 1956) (No. 628).
59. See Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitulional Rights,
35 Colum. L. Rev. 321 (1935), and Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77
U. Pa. L. Rev. 879 (1929) for excellent reviewus of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions.
60. 89 U. S.-(20 Wall). 445 (1874).
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the condition of a privilege. Dissenting, Chief Justice Waite ad-
vanced the privilege argument; the state could refuse permission
to the corporation to operate or could impose such conditions as it
thought proper. Although some of the later cases followed the
Morse decision,6 others were decided inconsistently with it."' These
latter cases held the disputed statutes constitutional, on the rationale
of the privilege argument. The irreconcilable conflict was finally
noted by the Court in 1922, and the Court chose to follow the
Morse line of cases and overrule the others. 3 These two lines of
cases illustrate a judicial wavering between acceptance and rejection
of the privilege argument which has not been unusual when condi-
tions on businesses are involved; in many instances the Supreme
Court has allowed constitutional rights to be given up through
privilege qualifications although there exist broad statements to the
effect that this cannot be done. 64
CONCLUSIONS
Looking at the total effect of the privilege argument it would
seem that it has had no overpowering success or failure. Rather, a
principle exists that constitutional rights cannot be destroyed by
conditioning privileges, but "this principle . . . is broader than
the applications thus far made of it." 65 Naturally enough, the un-
settled case law in this area has resulted in a certain amount of
judicial hesitance to speak in terms of proper or improper condi-
tions. 0
When the Supreme Court does come to the privilege argument,
an acceptance of it leads, of course, to an uncritical approval of the
government's action as "master of its own house." If, on the other
hand, the privilege argument is rejected the problem becomes a
matter of weighing the interests involved and determining the rea-
sonableness of the invasion of constitutional rights. This approach
was used in the Douds" and Mitchell s cases. When interests are
61. Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186 (1887) ; cf. Southern Pacific Co.
v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202 (1892).
62. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246 (1906) ; Doyle
v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535 (1877).
63. Terral v. Burke, 257 U. S. 529 (1922).
64. See Hale, op. cit. supra, note 59 at 322.
65. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U. S. 583, 598
(1926).
66. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954)
may be given as an example. As the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter
points out, the Court chose to meet several constitutional hurdles rather than
simply to say that the condition was a proper condition on a privilege. Id. at
74-78 (concurring opinion).
67. 339 U. S. at 387-389, 390-391.
68. 339 U. S. at 405 (dictum).
[Vol. 40:486
weighed, the fact that it is a gratuity which the government is affect-
ing is, of course, one factor to be considered. And it may be proper
to resolve all doubts in favor of the government. 9
As to the matter of acceptance or rejection of the privilege argu-
ment, the Court appears to be influenced by its ideas as to whether
the qualification is germane to the exercise of the privilege; i.e., if
the two are not thought reasonably related the Court is less likely
to look favorably on the idea that the government may condition
as it sees fit. We have seen this idea of reasonable relationship as a
major test in determining whether an attempt to condition is really
an attempt to punish for past conduct. Moreover, in many cases the
difference between the majority and minority opinions seems to be
disagreement over the connection between the condition and the
privilege. For instance, in the Frost case, Justices Holmes, Brandeis,
and McReynolds thought, contrary to the majority,0 that applying
public carrier regulatidns to private carriers was a means of aiding
the state to control highway traffic.7 ' We might also look at Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Watson v. Employers' Liab.
Assurance Corp., 2 in which he made an excellent analysis of uncon-
stitutional conditions on business. His conclusion was that the test
of the constitutionality of a condition on a privilege, for due processpurposes; is its reasonableness. 3 Such a rationale would include
both a consideration of the condition's association with the privilege
and a weighing of the various interests involved.
Another factor tending toward the rejection of the privilege
argument would be a recognition of the danger that constitutional
rights may be taken under the guise of conditioning privileges. Such
recognition now is frequently found in the legal profession. 4 This
may be due to an awareness of the increasing economic and social
activities of the government. This increasing activity, coupled with
the growing complexity of modern affairs, has led to a greater
69. Cf. United States v. Manzi, 276 U. S. 463 (192) (doubt concerning
privilege of citizenship should be resolved against claimant) ; Swan & Finch
Co. v. United States, 190 U. S. 143 (1903) (doubt concerning privilege of export
tax drawback should be resolved in favor of government) ; Hannibal & St.
Joseph R. R. v. Missouri River Packet Co., 125 U. S. 260 (1888) (statute
granting privilege should be construed in favor of government).
70. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U. S. 583,
591 (1926).
71. Id. at 601, 602 (dissenting opinions).
72. 348 U. S. 66 (1954).
73. Id. at 82 (concurring opinion).
Z4. For examples see Lawson v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 270
Wis. 269, 70 N. W. 2d 605, cert. denied, 24 U. S. L. Week 3128 (U.S. Nov. 7,
1955) (No. 354); Brief for American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, p. 29,
Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939), reprinted in 25 A. B. A. J. 7, 12 (1939).
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dependence on the exercise of privilege. Privileges are so essential
to modern life that the individual really has no choice of escaping
the conditions attached to the privileges. To say, for example, that
members of a labor union may escape any restrictions which are
attached to the use of the NLRB by the simple expedient of not
using the agency is to make a statement which is theoretically cor-
rect but patently unrealistic. It therefore seems that a weighing of
interests and a consideration of the relationship of the condition to
the privilege is preferable to an acceptance of the doctrine that the
government may dispense its privileges at its uncontrolled discre-
tion. While the term "privilege" may be useful to describe a govern-
ment gratuity, the label itself should not become a substitute for
judical reasoning. The privilege argument leads too easily to a denial
of constitutional protection.
